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Abstract: This research tested the idea that the risk of exclusion from one’s group motivates group members to 
engage in unethical behaviors that secure better outcomes for the group (pro-group unethical behaviors). We 
theorized that this effect occurs because those at risk of exclusion seek to improve their inclusionary status by 
engaging in unethical behaviors that benefit the group; we tested this assumption by examining how the effect 
of exclusion risk on pro-group unethical behavior varies as a function of group members’ need for inclusion. 
A 2-wave field study conducted among a diverse sample of employees working in groups (Study 1) and a 
constructive replication using a laboratory experiment (Study 2) provided converging evidence for the theory. 
Study 1 found that perceived risk of exclusion from one’s workgroup predicted employees’ engagement in 
pro-group unethical behaviors, but only when employees have a high (not low) need for inclusion. In Study 2, 
compared to low risk of exclusion from a group, high risk of exclusion led to more pro-group (but not pro-
self) unethical behaviors, but only for participants with a high (not low) need for inclusion. We discuss 
implications for theory and the management of unethical behaviors in organizations. 
 
Keywords: social exclusion, exclusion risk, pro-group unethical behavior, need for inclusion 
 
Rising reports of corporate scandals and incidents of employees engaging in behaviors that are considered 
“illegal or morally unacceptable to the larger community” (Jones, 1991, p. 367) have increased scholarly 
attention to the nature and causes of unethical behavior in organizations. Examples of unethical behaviors 
include stealing from one’s employer, deceiving customers, and misrepresenting performance (Treviño, den 
Nieuwenboer, & Kish-Gephart, 2014). The costs associated with just one type of these behaviors—employee 
theft—are estimated at as much as $40 billion yearly (U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 2013), which is nearly ten 
times the cost of all street crime combined, including burglaries and robberies (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 2011). A large body of research has identified characteristics of individuals, moral issues, and 
organizational contexts as antecedents of unethical behavior (Kish-Gephart, Harrison, & Treviño, 2010; 
Treviño, 1986; Treviño et al., 2014; Treviño, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006). 
A common assumption among many studies in the unethical behavior literature is that unethical behaviors 
produce benefits primarily for the self (Greenberg, 2002; Grover & Hui, 1994; Kish-Gephart et al., 2010; 
Reynolds, 2006; Sonenshein, 2007; Treviño et al., 2014; Treviño & Youngblood, 1990). However, employees 
sometimes behave unethically to benefit their workgroup (Gino & Pierce, 2009; Umphress, Bingham, & 
Mitchell, 2010). The popular press has highlighted such acts. For example, a New York Police Department 
narcotics detective, Stephen Anderson, reportedly framed innocent people to help fellow officers from his 
department achieve higher rates of drug-related arrests, allowing them to keep their jobs and outperform other 
departments in competition for federal antidrug funds (Balko, 2011). 
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We refer to these unethical behaviors as pro-group unethical behaviors, because the beneficiaries of the 
behavior are fellow group members and not just the person behaving unethically. Employees engage in 
various unethical behaviors to benefit their coworkers, such as misrepresenting performance and withholding 
relevant information from the public (Umphress et al., 2010). Although these types of unethical behaviors are 
estimated to cause high costs to organizations (Cialdini, Petrova, & Goldstein, 2004; Dunlop & Lee, 2004; 
Long & Rao, 1995), we know very little about what motivates group members to engage in pro-group 
unethical behaviors. Indeed, our review of the workplace unethical behavior literature, as summarized in Kish-
Gephart et al. (2010), found that virtually all studies examined unethical behaviors that produced benefits for 
the self rather than others (for notable exceptions, see Gino & Pierce, 2009; Umphress et al., 2010; 
Wiltermuth, Bennett, & Pierce, 2013). 
The contribution of our research is thus that we provide a theoretical model explaining why group members 
engage in unethical behaviors that benefit the workgroup, rather than unethical behaviors that primarily 
benefit the self. Our theory starts with the observation that pro-group unethical behaviors allow employees to 
contribute to their group’s interests over and beyond what would be possible through ethical means. What 
motivates group members to resort to unethical means to make particularly large contributions? We answer 
this question by considering the social motivation that stems from group members’ risk of exclusion from 
their group (Kurzban & Leary, 2001; Robinson, O’Reilly, & Wang, 2013; Scott & Thau, 2012). People 
fundamentally care about group inclusion (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) and take steps to minimize their risk of 
being excluded (Allen & Badcock, 2003; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995). Because inclusionary 
status in the group is affected by members’ level of contributions to the group (Hirshleifer & Rasmusen, 1989; 
Kurzban & Leary, 2001), group members at risk of exclusion should be particularly motivated to make as 
large contributions to their group as possible in an effort to improve their inclusionary status. When 
confronted with opportunities to increase their group contributions through unethical behavior, group 
members at exclusion risk should be more likely to use that opportunity. 
The focus on exclusion risk as a cause for pro-group unethical behaviors highlights a second contribution of 
our research. Past research on exclusion has primarily investigated the consequences of definite exclusion 
(i.e., absolute rejection or ejection from a group; Robinson et al., 2013; Scott & Thau, 2012). This work has 
shown that definitive exclusion motivates people to engage in antisocial behavior that is likely to promote 
further exclusion (e.g., Buckley, Winkel, & Leary, 2004; Maner, DeWall, Baumeister, & Schaller, 2007; 
Twenge, Baumeister, Tice, & Stucke, 2001; Twenge & Campbell, 2003). Yet, definitive exclusion is usually 
only the final result of a gradual worsening of a group member’s inclusionary status, during which group 
members receive signals that they are at risk of exclusion (Allen & Badcock, 2003; Molden, Lucas, Gardner, 
Dean, & Knowles, 2009). Our work contributes to this research by demonstrating that exclusion risk 
motivates group members to behave unethically to advance the interests of their group. 
We test our theory across two studies. Study 1 is a two-wave field survey among employees from various 
industries working in teams. It examines the relationship between perceptions of exclusion risk and pro-group 
unethical behaviors. Study 2 is a laboratory experiment that investigates whether exclusion risk uniquely 
causes pro-group unethical behaviors, as our theory claims, or whether exclusion risk also causes self-
benefiting unethical behaviors. To test our theory’s claim that pro-group unethical behavior is engaged in to 
improve inclusionary status, both studies examine whether the degree to which those at risk of exclusion 
engage in pro-group unethical behavior depends on the strength of their need for social inclusion (Hill, 1987; 
Leary & Allen, 2011). 
 
Exclusion Risk and Pro-Group Unethical Behavior 
 
Pro-group unethical behaviors are violations of moral and legal standards of how employees should behave 
when trying to contribute to the performance or well-being of their groups. For example, Umphress et al. 
(2010) found that employees misrepresented and exaggerated the truth about their company’s products and 
services to customers in order to benefit their company. Similarly, Geis (1977) reported a price-fixing scandal 
in which the employee who committed the unethical act claimed he did so to prevent fellow employees from 
losing their jobs. 
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The majority of past research on unethical behaviors was concerned with immoral or illegal actions that 
primarily benefit the person engaging in such behavior. The examples we just gave show that employees 
sometimes engage in unethical behaviors that can benefit the performance or well-being of others. That does 
not imply that pro-group unethical behavior serves no personal interest. By virtue of being a member of the 
group, the actor is likely to benefit from the contributions to the group. However, pro-group unethical 
behavior differs from the unethical behaviors in which the sole beneficiary is the self (e.g., stealing company 
money and keeping it for oneself). 
Another characteristic of pro-group unethical behavior is that it allows group members to contribute to the 
group’s performance and well-being of their group over and beyond the limits imposed by ethical rules. Moral 
and legal expectations constrain the amount of contributions an individual can make to the group in a given 
situation. For example, when sales agents are called upon to report their sales, they are expected to accurately 
report how much was sold. If the agent is part of a group that is remunerated on the basis of joint sales 
performance, the agent can benefit the group by inflating his or her sales. Similarly, the sales agent may be 
expected to share relevant product information that helps in selling a company product with employees 
outside the agent’s own workgroup. By withholding information from other groups but sharing it with the own 
group, individuals can contribute to their group beyond what would be possible if they were to do what is 
morally, or perhaps even legally, expected. 
When are group members motivated to increase their contributions to their groups and benefit their groups 
beyond what would be possible by behaving ethically? We answer this research question by considering group 
members’ motivation that follows from the risk of exclusion from the group. Theory and evidence suggest that 
groups put members at risk of exclusion when they perceive that members have insufficiently contributed to 
the group goals (Kurzban & Leary, 2001; Robinson et al., 2013; Scott, Restubog, & Zagenczyk, 2013; Scott & 
Thau, 2012). Groups benefit from members to the extent that members can effectively contribute to the group 
(Kurzban & Leary, 2001). For this reason, groups are sensitive to the value that each member brings to the 
group (Allen & Badcock, 2003) and are likely to retain members who contribute to the attainment of the 
group’s goals and socially exclude those who do not (Hirshleifer & Rasmusen, 1989; Kurzban & Leary, 
2001). 
Actual exclusion from a group is usually only the final result of a gradual deterioration in group members’ 
inclusionary status. Before individuals are definitely excluded, they likely receive signals from other group 
members that suggest they are at risk of being excluded. These signals may be communicated formally (e.g., 
being told to become a better team player in a performance review) or informally (e.g., being told that one 
may not “fit in”; Derfler-Rozin, Pillutla, & Thau, 2010). 
Being socially included is more or less important to all individuals. Consequently, group members are 
motivated to maintain good inclusionary status by ensuring that other group members perceive them as 
valuable contributors (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Hill, 1987). Those who perceive that they are at risk of 
exclusion will therefore be strongly motivated to improve their inclusionary status by demonstrating their 
value through increased contributions to the group (Allen & Badcock, 2003). Consistent with this idea, 
Derfler-Rozin et al. (2010) found that, compared to individuals who were not at risk of exclusion, those at risk 
of exclusion trusted others more. Trusting behavior can be interpreted as an attempt to improve one’s 
inclusionary status because the recipients of trust often reciprocate it, and a mutual relationship could develop 
as a result. Similarly, Molden et al. (2009) found that signs of the possibility of exclusion, as opposed to 
definite exclusion, were associated with more attempts to reengage in social contact. 
We argue, based on the theory and associated findings we presented above, that one way people can improve 
their inclusionary status is by increasing contributions to their group through pro-group unethical behavior. 
Because those at risk of exclusion wish to avoid definite exclusion, they are strongly motivated to demonstrate 
they are valuable to their group by increasing the level of their contributions. Pro-group unethical behavior 
allows employees who are at risk of being excluded to increase their contributions beyond what is possible 
through ethical means. Thus, employees at risk of exclusion should be more likely to resort to pro-group 
unethical behavior in an effort to improve their inclusionary status. We predict  
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between exclusion risk and pro-group unethical behaviors. 
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In making this prediction, we assume that the group knows about the contributions of its members but does 
not necessarily know whether the contribution was made by way of unethical means. This assumption is 
consistent with research showing that employees often report being unaware of unethical behavior performed 
by their coworkers (Berry, Carpenter, & Barratt, 2012; R. M. Lee, 1993). The lack of awareness about the 
unethicality of the contribution behavior could be because the transgressor conceals the unethical nature of the 
behavior or because the group does not want to know whether members’ contributions were rendered by 
unethical means. One well-known example is Enron’s CEO, Jeff Skilling, who did not want to know how 
exactly David Fastow, Enron’s CFO, was achieving the desired goal of removing poorly performing or 
volatile assets from Enron’s balance sheet (Jenkins, 2002). 
 
The Role of the Need for Social Inclusion 
 
An important assumption of our theory is that the reason why exclusion risk motivates individuals to engage 
in pro-group unethical behavior is because they seek to improve their inclusionary status in the group. One 
way of testing this assumption relies on the logic of examining theoretically relevant conditions under which, 
if the proposed explanation is correct, the effect of interest should exhibit differential levels of occurrence 
(Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). We argue below that a theoretically relevant condition that can be examined 
to probe the assumption that exclusion risk motivates individuals to engage in pro-group unethical behavior 
because they seek to improve their inclusionary status is the degree to which people care more versus less 
about their inclusion in groups. 
Although the need for inclusion is a universal need (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), just as with other needs, not 
all individuals care to the same degree about inclusion (Hill, 1987; Leary & Allen, 2011). Individuals with 
high inclusion needs are more strongly predisposed to seek out and maintain their inclusion in groups than are 
individuals with low inclusion needs. The need for social inclusion makes individuals averse to being rejected 
by others (Shipley & Veroff, 1952) and, instead, motivates them to establish, maintain, and restore social 
relationships (Koestner & McClelland, 1992; Leary, 2001; Leary & Allen, 2011). For instance, individuals 
with a strong need for inclusion are highly sensitive to affiliation cues they receive from other group members 
(Byrne, McDonald, & Mikawa, 1963; Pickett, Gardner, & Knowles, 2004), and they are sensitive to situations 
in which rejection is possible (Decharms, 1957). 
If those who are at risk of exclusion engage in pro-group unethical behavior because in this way they seek to 
improve their inclusionary status, this effect should be moderated by group members’ need for social 
inclusion. Individuals with a high need for inclusion should be more strongly motivated to improve their 
inclusionary status when faced with exclusion risk than should those with low need for inclusion (cf. Lecky, 
1945). If pro-group unethical behavior is engaged in as a means of improving one’s inclusionary status, when 
faced with exclusion risk, people with high inclusion needs should be motivated to resort to pro-group 
unethical behavior. In contrast, individuals whose need for social inclusion is low should be less motivated to 
engage in pro-group unethical behavior when faced with exclusion risk because they care less about inclusion 
in social groups. We predict  
 
Hypothesis 2: The need for social inclusion moderates the relationship between exclusion risk and pro-group 
unethical behavior such that the relationship is stronger when the need for inclusion is high rather than low. 
 
Overview of the Present Research 
 
We conducted two studies to test our theory. Study 1 was a field study with employees from various industries 
working in teams. Study 2 was a laboratory experiment that sought to constructively replicate the results of 
Study 1 in a controlled environment. Another goal in Study 2 was to exclude potential alternative 
explanations, which we discuss in the introduction of Study 2. Together, the two studies provide a test of our 
theory using both field and experimental laboratory methodologies, thus ensuring both the ecological and 
internal validity of our conclusions. 
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Study 1 
 
Method 
Sample and procedure 
Data were collected from individuals working in full-time positions among various industries located in the 
United States including finance, insurance, education, health care, information technology, and retail. Surveys 
were administered via the Internet. Students from a southeastern U.S. university were asked to serve as 
organizational contacts for course credit by providing the contact information for full-time working adults 
who worked in an environment with other coworkers and who expressed willingness to complete two surveys, 
separated by approximately three weeks. We followed design protocols established in the literature to ensure 
the data were from working adults (e.g., emphasize importance of integrity, compare student and participant e-
mail and International Protocol addresses; for a similar procedure, see, e.g., De Cremer, van Dijke, & Mayer, 
2010; Grant & Mayer, 2009; Mayer, Aquino, Greenbaum, & Kuenzi, 2012). 
A total of 298 individuals completed the Time 1 survey (83.9% response rate), and 252 individuals completed 
the Time 2 survey (71.0% response rate from the overall initial starting sample of 355). The Time 1 survey 
contained measures of our independent variables and control variables, and the Time 2 survey contained the 
dependent variable and demographic questions. The independent and dependent measures were collected at 
two different points in time to strengthen the ability to make a causal inference and to reduce common method 
bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). The final sample consisted of 228 respondents who 
provided complete responses for our study’s variables (Mage = 42.4 years, SDage = 12.7, Mtenure = 8.13 
years, SDtenure = 7.5; 57.94% were women and 48.4% were managers). 
 
Measures 
The Appendix contains details of additional studies conducted to evaluate the validity of the risk of exclusion 
and pro-group unethical behavior measures used in Study 1. Unless otherwise noted, all items in Study 1 were 
measured on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). 
Risk of exclusion 
To measure perceived risk of exclusion, we adapted seven items from the Workplace Ostracism Scale (Ferris, 
Brown, Berry, & Lian, 2008) and the UCLA Loneliness Scale (Russell, Peplau, & Cutrona, 1980) to reflect 
possible, rather than definite, exclusion. Respondents indicated their agreement with the following seven 
items: “I sometimes feel as though members of my workgroup might ignore me,” “I feel like it is likely that 
my workgroup members will not invite me for lunch,” “I wonder if my workgroup members might try to 
avoid me,” “I suspect I might be shut out of conversation by my workgroup members,” “I think it is possible 
that members of my workgroup might treat me as if I am not there,” “I feel that members of my workgroup 
might not invite me or ask me if I wanted anything when they go out for a coffee break.” 
Need for inclusion 
We used a six-item measure by Armeli, Eisenberger, Fasolo, and Lynch (1998) to assess individuals’ need for 
social inclusion. Sample items are “I feel like I have really accomplished something valuable when I am able 
to get close to someone” and “Just being around others and finding out about them is one of the most 
interesting things I can think of doing.” 
Pro-group unethical behavior 
A five-item measure of unethical pro-group behavior was developed for this study, based on items from 
Mitchell, Baer, Ambrose, Folger, and Palmer (2012). The items measured the frequency with which 
employees engaged in different unethical behaviors for the benefit of their workgroup: “Failed to tell someone 
not in your workgroup that something they did was done wrong so they do not perform as well as your 
workgroup,” “Discredited another workgroup or another workgroup member’s performance to make your 
workgroup look better,” “Bad-mouthed another workgroup or another workgroup member to take them out of 
the competition for opportunities in the company,” “Withheld information to put your workgroup ahead of 
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another workgroup or another workgroup member,” “Purposely did not include another workgroup member to 
make your workgroup more valuable” (1 = Never; 5 = Very often). 
We also measured several theoretically relevant control variables. 
Self-control 
To account for the possibility that those at risk of exclusion behave more unethically because their self-control 
is impaired (Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & Twenge, 2005; Mead, Baumeister, Gino, Schweitzer, & Ariely, 
2009), we assessed chronic self-control via the measure by Tangney, Baumeister, and Boone (2004). Sample 
items are “I am able to work effectively toward long-term goals” and “I have a hard time breaking bad habits” 
(reverse-coded). 
Job satisfaction 
We controlled for participants’ job satisfaction because previous research suggests it can affect employees’ 
willingness to engage in unethical behavior (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010). Employees indicated their agreement 
with six items (e.g., “I feel fairly satisfied with my present job,” “Most days I am enthusiastic about my 
work”) from a job satisfaction scale (Brooke, Russell, & Price, 1988) based on Brayfield and Rothe (1951). 
Dispositional affectivity 
We controlled for respondents’ long-term affectivity to account for the possibility that exclusion risk affects 
how people feel (Allen & Badcock, 2003; N. I. Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003), which could 
influence how they approach moral issues at work (Yang & Diefendorff, 2009). We used the 20-item Positive 
and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Employees indicated how often 
they had experienced the feeling depicted (e.g., “hostile,” “enthusiastic”) over the past 6 months on a 5-point 
scale (1 = Not at all; 7 = A lot). 
Impression management 
Because our questions concerned sensitive topics, we controlled for participants’ tendency to respond in a 
socially desirable manner using the impression management subscale from the Balanced Inventory of 
Desirable Responding (Paulhus, 1984). Respondents indicated their agreement with the statements (e.g., 
“Once in a while I laugh at a dirty joke,” “I have some pretty awful habits”), and the responses were averaged. 
Demographics 
Finally, we controlled for employee age and gender, as prior research suggests that these variables may affect 
employees’ willingness to engage in unethical behavior at work (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010). 
 
Results and Discussion 
Hypothesis 1 test 
Table 1 contains variable means, standard deviations, internal consistency statistics, and correlations. We 
conducted hierarchical regression analyses to test our prediction that need for social inclusion moderates the 
effects of risk of exclusion on pro-group unethical behavior. The results of the analyses are presented in Table 
2. We found a significant positive effect of exclusion risk on pro-group unethical behaviors, b = 0.10, SE = 
0.05, t(218) = 2.16, p = .032 (see also Table 2, Model 2), supporting Hypothesis 1. 
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Study 1: Means, Standard Deviations, Correlations, and Internal Consistency Statistics 
 
 
Study 1: Moderated Regression Analysis Results 
 
Hypothesis 2 test 
Table 2 (Model 3) also shows that the interaction between exclusion risk and need for inclusion is significant, 
b = 0.12, SE = 0.05, t(217) = 2.38, p = .018. To interpret the interaction, we analyzed simple slopes of 
exclusion risk at ±1 SD of employees’ need for inclusion (see Figure 1). As predicted, the effect of exclusion 
risk on pro-group unethical behavior was not significant when need for inclusion was low (2.91), b = 0.03, SE 
= 0.05, t(217) = 0.60, p = .550, but it was significant and positive when need for inclusion was high (4.18), b 
= 0.18, SE = 0.06, t(217) = 3.19, p = .002. These results show that individuals who perceived they were at risk 
of exclusion were more likely to engage in pro-group unethical behavior when they had a high need for social 
inclusion, but not when they had a low need for social inclusion, supporting Hypothesis 2. 
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Figure 1. Study 1: Simple slopes for employees’ pro-group unethical behavior. 
 
Study 2 
 
Study 2 was designed to extend Study 1 in two ways. First, correlational studies do not allow for causal 
inferences, so we replicated Study 1 with a lab experiment in which participants were randomly assigned to 
conditions. Second, another potential limitation of Study 1 was that we were unable to distinguish between 
pro-group unethical behavior and unethical behavior motivated by self-interest. Although we used a measure 
tapping specifically into unethical behaviors that benefit the group and the validation studies reported in the 
Appendix show that this measure captures a construct distinct from self-serving unethical behavior, Study 1 
does not explicitly exclude the possibility that exclusion risk leads to an increase in all types of unethical 
behavior. We considered this possibility unlikely, given the evidence supporting Hypothesis 2 and showing 
that the effect of exclusion risk on pro-group unethical behavior is stronger for those with high need for 
inclusion (i.e., individuals highly motivated to maintain and improve their inclusionary status; Koestner & 
McClelland, 1992; Leary, 2001; Leary & Allen, 2011). If the unethical behavior as a result of exclusion risk 
were not aimed to benefit the group, there would be no differences in the effect of exclusion risk as a function 
of inclusion needs. 
Nevertheless, in Study 2 we address this concern directly by experimentally varying whether participants’ 
unethical behaviors benefited either the group but not the self, or the self but not the group. If exclusion risk 
leads to unethical behavior aimed at benefiting the group as a means of improving inclusionary status (rather 
than a general propensity to behave unethically), then participants at high risk of exclusion, compared to those 
at low risk of exclusion, should engage in more unethical behavior only when such behavior benefits the 
group and not when it benefits themselves. 
The final goal in Study 2 was to constructively replicate (Lykken, 1968; Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002) 
the moderating effect of need for inclusion on the effect of exclusion risk on pro-group unethical behavior. To 
this end, we used an alternative (Leary, Kelly, Cottrell, & Schreindorfer, 2013) but also widely used measure 
of inclusion needs (e.g., Blader & Chen, 2011; Molden et al., 2009; Murray et al., 2005; Plaut, Garnett, 
Buffardi, & Sanchez-Burks, 2011) to assess participants’ need for inclusion a week prior to the experiment. 
As in Study 1, need for inclusion was expected to moderate the effect of exclusion risk such that the positive 
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effect of exclusion risk on pro-group unethical behavior is stronger among those with high, compared to low, 
need for inclusion. In contrast, when the unethical behavior benefits the self, exclusion risk should have no 
effect on unethical behavior regardless of participants’ inclusion needs. 
 
Method 
Participants and design 
One hundred university subject pool members participated in the study in exchange for £12 (Mage = 26.09 
years, SDage = 9.48; 59.00% female). Subjects were told the study was about group formation and were asked 
to complete a prestudy questionnaire (ostensibly measuring personality characteristics shown to predict 
leadership emergence in groups) 1 week prior to the experiment. The lab experiment was a 2 (exclusion risk: 
high vs. low) × 2 (unethical behavior beneficiary: pro-group vs. pro-self) between-subjects design, with 
participants randomly assigned to one of the conditions. Participants were run in sessions of four. In one 
session, participants indicated they all knew each other (in no other session was this indicated). As the 
experiment manipulated intragroup relationships, their knowledge threatened to invalidate the cover story and 
the manipulations, so these four cases were excluded from the analysis sample.  
 
Prestudy questionnaire and need for inclusion measure 
In the prestudy questionnaire, participants indicated their agreement with a list of statements on a 5-point scale 
(1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree). Among filler statements, the 10 items from the Need to Belong 
Scale (Leary et al., 2013) were included to measure participants’ chronic need for social inclusion (α = .85). 
Sample items are “I want other people to accept me” and “I have a strong need to belong.” 
 
Experiment procedure and materials 
Participants arrived at the lab in groups of four and were told that the study consisted of three group tasks. 
Upon arrival, participants were given blue tags to wear on their shirts, identifying them by color and number 
(e.g., “Blue 1”). They were then led to a room and presented with an overview of the experiment. Participants 
were told that they would first engage in a 15-minute group discussion. The second task was described as a 
competition against another group in the other room (the “Reds”), with a chance of winning additional 
compensation. Participants were also told that only three out of the four people were required for the final 
group task and that they would have to select who would be included in the final task. The person not chosen 
to participate would do a similar individual task instead. No compensation was announced for either final task. 
After the overview, participants were told to start the first group task, the 15-minute group discussion. They 
were given a set of questions about their personal lives (adapted from Sedikides, Campbell, Reader, & Elliot, 
1999), and it was suggested they answer the questions in turns to facilitate the discussion and allow 
participants to get to know each other. 
Fifteen minutes later, the experimenter returned and instructed the participants to log onto their computers 
(located in isolated cubicles in the same room) and follow the instructions on the screen to engage in the 
problem-solving task. Participants were also instructed to verify each other’s group member numbers briefly 
for purposes of the vote for the inclusion in the third group task. 
Exclusion risk manipulation 
The computer informed the participants that a brief preliminary vote for the inclusion in the third group task 
would take place before they engaged in the problem-solving task. Participants were told that the final vote 
deciding who would be included in the third group task would take place after the problem-solving task. They 
were asked to cast their preliminary vote for two (out of three) members they wanted to be included in the 
third group task. Afterward, participants saw an indicator suggesting that the computer was awaiting 
responses from all members to be entered. Then, all members were shown the results of the preliminary 
voting. 
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In the high risk of exclusion condition, participants read that only one other group member voted for them to 
be included in the final task and their chance of being included in the final task was therefore low. In the low 
risk of exclusion condition, they read that three other group members voted for them and their chance of being 
included in the final task was therefore high. They were reminded that this vote was only preliminary and that 
the final vote would be made after the problem-solving task. 
Unethical behavior beneficiary manipulation and manipulation check 
Next, participants were told that the problem-solving task consisted of solving 10 anagrams (words in which 
letters have been scrambled). The goal of the task was to work out the original words within three minutes. 
Participants were told they would compete against a member of the “Reds” group and that the person who 
solved more anagrams would win the competition. Further, in the pro-group [pro-self] condition, the 
instructions read, “Note that you will compete on behalf of your group [yourself]. If you win the competition, 
each member of your group (except you) [you (and no one else)] will win an extra £2 bonus.” 
Next, because our theory suggests that exclusion risk prompts pro-group unethical behavior with the goal of 
improving one’s inclusionary status in the group, it was important to make participants’ performance in the 
task known to their group members. Thus, in both conditions the following line read, “Your result in the 
competition will be known to other group members.” 
On the next screen, participants were asked to respond to five questions purportedly checking their 
comprehension of the task (1 = Strongly agree; 5 = Strongly disagree). Three of the questions verified they 
understood what anagrams were and how to solve them (e.g., “Anagrams contain rearranged letters from 
common words in English,” “I have to use all the letters in the anagram to work out the original word”). All 
participants responded correctly to these questions. The final two questions checked the effectiveness of our 
manipulation: “If I win the competition, members of my group get a bonus” and “If I win the competition, I 
get a bonus.” 
Unethical behavior measure 
Participants then saw the 10 anagrams and a 3-minute countdown timer that reminded them of the time they 
had left to work on the anagrams. They were provided with pen and paper to help them work on the anagrams. 
After 3 minutes, the page auto-advanced and participants were asked to report the number of anagrams they 
solved (1 = None, 10 = All). Unbeknownst to the participants, the anagrams were unsolvable, so the number of 
anagrams reported as solved constituted our measure of cheating. To minimize suspicion, the anagrams were 
selected from common English words and we changed a single letter to make them unsolvable. All 
participants were native English speakers, so it was almost impossible for them to mistakenly think they had 
constructed a common English word. This measure of cheating has been widely used in prior research (e.g., 
DePalma, Madey, & Bornschein, 1995; R. Eisenberger & Leonard, 1980; R. Eisenberger & Masterson, 1983; 
R. Eisenberger & Shank, 1985; Pitesa, Thau, & Pillutla, 2013; Shmueli & Muraven, 2007; Wiltermuth, 2010). 
Exclusion risk manipulation check 
After reporting the number of anagrams solved, participants responded to several questions ostensibly aimed 
at checking whether they understood the previous group interaction and how the upcoming final voting would 
be conducted. In addition to administering comprehension checks (e.g., “Only three out of four members will 
be selected for the final group task,” “Members will vote on who will be selected for the final group task”), to 
which all participants responded correctly, we administered the following items measuring perceived risk of 
exclusion: “I was at risk of being excluded from the group” and “My chances of being included were low.” 
The two items were averaged and used as the exclusion risk manipulation check (r = .66, p < .001). 
Afterward, participants reported their age and gender. The experimenter then informed them the study was 
over and debriefed them thoroughly. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Analysis 
Our experimental design required participants to be run in sessions of four, yielding a data structure in which 
participants were nested in sessions. This design could thus lead to nonindependent observations within 
11 
 
sessions, violating statistical assumptions of ordinary least squares–based regression techniques (including 
analysis of variance) and potentially biasing the standard errors of the regression parameters. Confirming that 
the data had a nested structure, a preliminary analysis of the dependent variable (number of anagrams 
misreported) revealed a significant between-session variance, F(24, 95) = 2.46, p = .002, and intraclass 
correlation, ICC1 95% CIs [0.048, 0.486]. We thus analyzed Study 2 data using multilevel linear regression 
with restricted maximum likelihood estimation, which produces unbiased standard errors and parameter 
estimates with nested data (Hox, 2010; Kenward & Roger, 1997). All parameters were estimated as fixed (γ) 
effects.  
Manipulation checks 
Participants in the pro-group condition (M = 4.69, SD = 0.78) indicated a greater level of agreement with the 
statement that their group would win a bonus if they won the competition than did participants in the pro-self 
condition (M = 1.60, SD = 1.03), γ = 3.02, SE = 0.19, z = 16.30, p < .001. Participants in the pro-self condition 
(M = 4.83, SD = 0.38) indicated a greater level of agreement with the statement that they would win a bonus if 
they won the competition than did participants in the pro-group condition (M = 2.48, SD = 1.65), γ = 2.30, SE 
= 0.24, z = 9.47, p < .001. Thus, participants in the pro-self condition believed they (but not their group) 
would win the bonus if they won the competition, but participants in the pro-group condition believed their 
group (but not they) would win the bonus if they won the competition. These results show that the 
manipulation of unethical behavior beneficiary was successful. 
In addition, participants in the high exclusion risk condition reported they were at greater risk of being 
excluded from the group (M = 4.39, SD = 0.99) than participants in the low exclusion risk condition (M = 
2.51, SD = 1.10), γ = 1.87, SE = 0.21, z = 9.09, p < .001. Thus, the exclusion risk manipulation was also 
successful. 
Hypothesis 1 test 
To test Hypothesis 1, we must examine whether exclusion risk leads to more pro-group unethical behavior. In 
addition, if the effect of exclusion risk is specific to pro-group unethical behavior, as we claim, and does not 
promote unethical behavior more generally, then exclusion risk should have no effect when the self (but not 
the group) is the beneficiary of the unethical behavior. Thus, to show this more stringent evidence for 
Hypothesis 1, we must demonstrate a significant interaction between exclusion risk and unethical behavior 
beneficiary on unethical behavior (indicating that the effect of exclusion risk differs significantly depending 
on the beneficiary of unethical behavior) such that exclusion risk leads to more unethical behavior when the 
beneficiary is the group but not when the beneficiary is the self. 
Figure 2 displays the mean number of anagrams misreported as solved by condition. As shown in Table 3 
(Model 1), the expected interaction between exclusion risk and unethical behavior beneficiary was significant, 
γ = 1.63, SE = 0.79, z = 2.07, p = .038, and an analysis of simple slopes revealed that exclusion risk led to 
more pro-group unethical behavior, γ = 1.21, SE = 0.53, z = 2.27, p = .023 (Mrisk = 2.58, SDrisk = 2.40; Mno 
risk = 1.08, SDno risk = 2.24), but not more pro-self unethical behavior, γ = −0.42, SE = 0.53, z = −0.79, p = 
.428 (Mrisk = 1.04, SDrisk = 1.20; Mno risk = 1.38, SDno risk = 1.53). These results support Hypothesis 1. 
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Figure 2. Study 2: Mean number of anagrams misreported by condition. Error bars represent standard 
errors. 
 
 
 
Study 2: Multilevel Moderated Regression Analysis Results 
 
Hypothesis 2 test 
To test Hypothesis 2, we examined whether the effect of exclusion risk on pro-group unethical behavior varies 
as a function of participants’ need for inclusion such that the effect is stronger when they have a strong need 
for social inclusion. In contrast, exclusion risk should have no effect on unethical behavior when the 
beneficiary of the behavior is the self, regardless of participants’ need for inclusion. This pattern of results 
implies a three-way interaction among exclusion risk, unethical behavior beneficiary, and need for inclusion, 
such that the effect of exclusion risk varies as a function of need for inclusion when the unethical behavior 
benefits the group but does not vary as a function of need for inclusion when the unethical behavior benefits 
the self. 
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The results are reported in Table 3 (Model 2). The expected three-way interaction was significant, γ = 2.64, 
SE = 1.14, z = 2.33, p = .020, so we followed the procedure specified by Dawson and Richter (2006) in 
interpreting the interaction. As summarized in Table 4 and depicted in Figure 3, the effect of exclusion risk on 
pro-group unethical behavior was stronger among those with high need for inclusion (4.05), γ = 2.46, SE = 
0.75, z = 3.28, p = .001, than those with low need for inclusion (2.71), γ = 0.01, SE = 0.78, z = 0.01, p = .995, 
and the slope difference between these two slopes was statistically significant, γ = −2.45, SE = 1.09, z = 
−2.25, p = .025. In contrast, exclusion risk had no effect on pro-self unethical behavior regardless of the level 
of participants’ need for social inclusion. Accordingly, the slopes for the effect of exclusion risk on pro-self 
unethical behavior as a function of inclusion needs were nonsignificant and did not differ between each other 
(see Table 4 for all details). The results provide support for Hypothesis 2. 
 
 
Study 2: Simple Slopes for the Effect of Exclusion Risk on Number of Anagrams Misreported (Up) and Slope 
Difference Test (Down) 
 
 
Figure 3. Study 2: Simple slopes for the effect of exclusion risk on the number of anagrams misreported as a 
function of unethical behavior beneficiary and need for inclusion. 
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General Discussion 
 
We argued that exclusion risk motivates employees to engage in unethical behaviors that have the potential to 
benefit their workgroup and that they do so in an attempt of improving their inclusionary status. Two studies 
offer evidence for our theory. Study 1 found that employees who believed they were at risk of exclusion (e.g., 
believed that it was likely that workgroup members might avoid, exclude, or ignore them) were more likely to 
engage in general acts of pro-group unethical behavior (e.g., discrediting, bad-mouthing, and excluding out-
group individuals to enhance group goals), particularly when the employee had a high need for inclusion. 
When the employee’s need for inclusion was low, exclusion risk did not predict pro-group unethical behavior. 
Overall, the results support the notion that pro-group unethical behavior is motivated by the goal of improving 
inclusionary status. Study 2 replicated this pattern of results experimentally and also showed that the effect of 
exclusion risk is specific to pro-group unethical behavior (but does not affect pro-self unethical behavior), 
thus providing additional evidence for our theory. 
 
Theoretical Contribution 
This research makes several theoretical contributions. Much of the literature on unethical behavior 
conceptualized unethical behavior as primarily self-benefiting (Greenberg, 2002; Grover & Hui, 1994; Kish-
Gephart et al., 2010; Reynolds, 2006; Sonenshein, 2007; Treviño & Youngblood, 1990). However, employees 
sometimes engage in unethical behavior to benefit their workgroup (Gino & Pierce, 2009; Umphress et al., 
2010). Although such pro-group unethical behavior may result in actions that are devastating to organizations, 
there is little research explaining unethical behavior committed to benefit others (Treviño et al., 2014; 
Umphress & Bingham, 2011). We advance the understanding of unethical actions that benefit one’s group by 
emphasizing the importance of a fundamental aspect of the relationship between the individual and the group: 
group members’ inclusionary status in the group. We show that the risk of exclusion from the group serves as 
a powerful motivator of pro-group unethical behavior and in so doing detect an important factor driving this 
problematic behavior in organizations. 
Our results are also relevant for social exclusion research. This literature has focused predominately on the 
effect of definite exclusion and has overlooked the role of the risk of exclusion. Yet, exclusion risk is likely to 
precede definite exclusion (Allen & Badcock, 2003) and may occur in many cases that do not result in definite 
exclusion (Molden et al., 2009). For this reason, exclusion risk may be a more frequent experience in 
organizations. To date, however, it remains relatively unexplored. We contribute to the literature by 
investigating the consequences of exclusion risk for the important social phenomenon of unethical behavior 
that seeks to provide benefits for others. In contrast to past work on definite exclusion, which has concluded 
that exclusion leads to undifferentiated antisocial responses that seem self-defeating and irrational because 
such acts likely further worsen the individual’s social position (e.g., Buckley et al., 2004; Maner et al., 2007; 
Twenge et al., 2001; Twenge & Campbell, 2003), our studies found that exclusion risk promotes more 
calculated actions aimed at improving the person’s inclusionary status. For instance, in Study 2, we found that 
exclusion risk led to more unethical behavior when such behavior benefited the group (and not the self), but 
not when the behavior benefited the self (and not the group). 
At a more general level, our research also contributes to past work in related disciplines, which has viewed the 
possibility that others would exclude the person committing unethical acts as a major deterrent to unethical 
behavior (e.g., Hirschi, 1969; Hollinger, 1986; Hollinger & Clark, 1982; Sims, 2002; Toby, 1957). We 
contribute to this literature by emphasizing that, in certain situations, unethical behavior is engaged in to 
benefit one’s group. We show that when this is the case, exclusionary concerns have a different motivational 
effect from that usually assumed. Those at risk of exclusion become highly motivated to improve their 
standing by increasing their contributions to the group. Because pro-group unethical behavior offers a way for 
people to increase the contributions to their group beyond what is possible through ethical means, those at risk 
of exclusion are particularly likely to engage in it. 
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Limitations and Future Research 
The theory we proposed and tested in this research is agnostic with respect to the group’s knowledge of the 
fact that the member’s contributions made through pro-group unethical behavior were accomplished 
immorally. As discussed previously, some groups might tolerate occasional unethical contributions on the part 
of their members (or even appreciate them as a sign of the member’s willingness to take on a personal risk to 
benefit the group), but some groups might object to the unethical nature of the contribution. We tacitly 
assumed that the member engaging in pro-group unethical behavior would be strategic about revealing the 
unethical nature of the contribution based on the knowledge of within-group ethical norms and preferences. 
When the member anticipates that the group might react negatively to the fact that the contribution was made 
through unethical means, the member is likely to conceal the unethical nature of the contribution. In the field 
study (Study 1), using a sample that was probably normally distributed in terms of respondents’ within-group 
ethical norms and their group’s knowledge of its members’ pro-group unethical behavior, we found support 
for our theory that exclusion risk motivates more pro-group unethical behavior (and especially among those 
strongly motivated to be included), suggesting the external validity of our theory across a range of real-world 
situations. Nevertheless, this research may be extended by taking into account these situational features and by 
providing empirical evidence for their role in the effect of exclusion risk on pro-group unethical behavior. 
Future research might vary experimentally whether the group is aware of the unethical nature of the 
contribution in conjunction with within-group ethical norms (cf. Pearsall & Ellis, 2011) to test how these 
factors moderate the effect of exclusion risk as documented in this research. 
A limitation of this research warranting discussion is the fact that we focused on situations in which people 
are able to increase their contributions to the group through unethical behavior beyond what is possible 
through ethical means. In some situations, however, there will be no occasion to contribute to the group 
unethically. In other cases, the ratio of personal investment (in terms of time, energy, and risk incurred) to 
potential gains (i.e., total contributions to the group generated) will favor ethical over unethical conduct. For 
example, this might be the case in situations in which only minor contributions can be made unethically or in 
situations in which behaving unethically involves a risk of extremely harsh sanctions. Nevertheless, our 
research, like all research on unethical behavior (and social science research more generally), seeks to explain 
behavior in situations that do afford a reasonable opportunity for engaging in the behavior of interest. 
A final avenue for future research on pro-group unethical behaviors is to more systematically consider 
situations in which the self’s and the group’s outcomes are unrelated, positively interdependent, or negatively 
interdependent (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). Our research was concerned with situations in which the group is 
the primary beneficiary of the unethical behavior and the self’s direct outcomes were unaffected by the 
behavior. In many situations, both the self and the group are direct beneficiaries of the focal actor’s 
transgression and their outcomes are positively interdependent. These are arguably the most common 
situations of pro-group unethical behaviors, and it is possible that many of the causes that past research 
identified to predict unethical behavior in general are also predictive of such pro-group unethical behaviors. 
Finally, in some situations the self’s and the group’s outcomes may be negatively interdependent. These are 
situations in which the focal actor makes heroic sacrifices to benefit the group through an unethical act. One 
example may be an unethical act that will lead to punishment of the focal actor but the group goes either 
completely unpunished or just suffers a comparatively lesser punishment. Future research could take these 
differences in outcome interdependence more systematically into account. To us, sacrificial pro-group 
unethical behavior seems to be an area of research that is particularly interesting and unexplored, and we 
encourage researchers to devote attention to understanding when and why individuals engage in sacrificial 
pro-group unethical behaviors. 
 
Practical Implications 
The present research has important implications for practice. Unethical behavior in organizations can prove to 
be very costly to organizations and their members (Cialdini et al., 2004; Dunlop & Lee, 2004; Long & Rao, 
1995). Therefore, it is important for organizational decision makers to understand factors that motivate 
unethical behaviors in order to address the issue effectively. Our results suggest that workgroup social 
dynamics impact employees’ unethical behavior, especially when this behavior promotes the group’s goals. In 
particular, those at risk of exclusion from their workgroup were more likely to engage in unethical pro-group 
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behavior. Notably, although these acts may produce benefit to the workgroup (and potentially the 
organization) in the short term, they may very well prove costly to the workgroup and the organization in the 
long term. The findings from our studies imply that leaders should be particularly alert to employees who are 
at risk of exclusion. Employees who believe they are at risk of being excluded may engage in behaviors that 
are unethical, costly, and harmful. In such situations, these vulnerable team members should be managed with 
care. 
Our studies provide a possible policy implication concerning sanctioning systems aimed at regulating 
unethical behavior. Instead of simply sanctioning employees who behave unethically, managers should, when 
possible, enact publicly stated policies qualifying that team contributions are based on ethical behaviors and 
that, potentially, an entire team may be held accountable for contributions that were misrepresented or were 
accomplished through unethical means. Such a policy would reduce the value of unethical behavior as a 
means of improving one’s inclusionary status and would, thus, be likely to discourage such unwelcome 
behaviors. 
Finally, decision makers may also deter pro-group unethical behavior by focusing on other situational 
elements that make such behavior less rewarding, more difficult to execute, or more detectable by superiors 
(Tenbrunsel, Smith-Crowe, & Umphress, 2003). We argued that, in certain cases, employees can contribute to 
their workgroup through unethical behavior over and beyond what they could contribute through ethical 
behavior. These types of behaviors allow employees at risk of exclusion to provide benefits for their 
workgroup, which serves to demonstrate their value to their workgroup and potentially avoid definitive 
exclusion. Yet, theorists (Tenbrunsel et al., 2003) have argued that organizations may foster ethical behavior 
and minimize unethical behavior if appropriate, ethical infrastructures guide the actions of employees who are 
faced with difficult choices, such as how to improve their inclusionary status. If decision makers find a way to 
create opportunities for employees to increase contributions to and benefits for their workgroup through 
ethical means, pro-group unethical behavior may simply be rendered less necessary, which should reduce its 
occurrence. In addition, making pro-group unethical behavior more difficult to execute or easier to detect 
should reduce its attractiveness to employees at risk of exclusion, as they might not dare to expose their 
workgroup to potential sanctions (and in that way also jeopardize their own inclusionary status even further). 
 
Conclusion 
This research proposed that the risk of exclusion motivates people to engage in pro-group unethical behavior 
as a means of improving their inclusionary status. Using both field and experimental studies, we found 
converging support for this theory: Exclusion risk motivated greater pro-group unethical behavior, and this 
effect was stronger the greater the individual’s need for inclusion. Our results extend the understanding of pro-
group unethical behavior and open up new avenues of research by demonstrating the importance of exclusion 
risk for understanding moral and legal transgressions. 
 
 
Footnotes  
1 The pattern of the effects and their statistical significance pertaining to the hypotheses tests remain the same 
regardless of whether we include or exclude these four cases. 
2 We note that ordinary least squares estimation leads to the same substantive conclusions for all analyses 
reported; the pattern of the effects and their statistical significance are the same regardless of the estimation 
method. 
3 We thank an anonymous reviewer for making this suggestion. 
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APPENDIX A: Study 1: Scale Validation Methods and Results 
We report here the two supplemental data collections undertaken to examine the validity the risk of exclusion 
and pro-group unethical behavior measures used in Study 1. The same scale validation strategy was followed 
in both data collections. 
Because there were no existing established measures of the two constructs, we followed Anderson and 
Gerbing (1988) and tested convergent validity by examining whether all the items of the measure load 
significantly onto the latent construct (see, e.g., Epitropaki & Martin, 2004; Holtz & Harold, 2009, for the 
same approach). We also tested whether the variance the constructs share with their indicators (ρvc) is higher 
than the convergent validity threshold of .5 (Fornell & Larcker, 1981) as an additional way to examine 
convergent validity. 
Next, because discriminant validity “means that one can empirically differentiate the construct from other 
constructs that may be similar” (Kerlinger, 1973, p. 462), we tested discriminant validity by examining 
whether our measures are distinguishable from measures of similar but theoretically distinct constructs (see 
also Messick, 1995). This was done first through a preliminary exploratory factor analysis (EFA) that 
examined whether our construct loads onto a separate factor and does not cross-load onto other factors. Next, 
we used a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to model the relevant constructs as distinct, then restricted the 
variance between the relevant pairs of constructs in subsequent nested models to one; if this resulted in a 
poorer model fit, we concluded the two constructs were distinct (Bagozzi, Yi, & Phillips, 1991; Widaman, 
1985). 
Finally, we provided further evidence of the nomological validity of our measures by examining whether each 
correlates with an additional set of theoretically related variables (Bagozzi, 1980; Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). 
Measure statistics for the two data collections are presented in Tables A1 and A2 at the end of the Appendix. 
Unless otherwise noted, we used 5-point scales with anchors taken from the original research in which the 
measure was described, which we cite for each scale. 
 
 
Exclusion Risk Measure Validation Data Collection: Means, Standard Deviations, Correlations, and Internal 
Consistency Statistics 
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Pro-Group Unethical Behavior Measure Validation Data Collection: Means, Standard Deviations, 
Correlations, and Internal Consistency Statistics 
 
Data Collection 
The sample consisted of 189 full-time employees working in workgroups (Mage = 34.27 years, SDage = 
10.34, Mtenure = 8.36 years, SDtenure = 5.85; 58.76% male). They were recruited through Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk, an online crowd-sourcing mechanism with members representative of the U.S. population 
(see Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011, for subject pool details). Participants responded to our exclusion 
risk measure and a series of other measures used to establish the validity of our measure. 
To examine discriminant validity, we administered the two measures from which we drew to create the 
exclusion risk measure, the Workplace Ostracism Scale (Ferris et al., 2008) and the UCLA Loneliness Scale 
(Russell et al., 1980). The measure of exclusion risk should be distinguishable from the Workplace Ostracism 
Scale, because the latter represents the state of definitive rather than possible exclusion. It should also be 
distinguishable from the UCLA Loneliness Scale, because loneliness is a psychological symptom rather than a 
social situation. We also included the coworker social support measure developed by Ganster, Fusilier, and 
Mayes (1986). Our exclusion risk measure should be distinguishable from this construct because it is more 
focused on task-related social interactions and, similar to the Ostracism Scale, concerns a current rather than 
potential or anticipated state. 
To examine nomological validity, we administered measures of three constructs theoretically predicted to 
correlate with exclusion risk. First, Allen and Badcock (2003) suggested that exclusion risk results in a 
depressed mood so we administered the PANAS mood measure (Watson et al., 1988). Theory also suggests 
that exclusion risk should result in a greater attentiveness to potentially threatening social information (Allen 
& Badcock, 2003). We thus measured the motivation to acquire relationship-threatening information in the 
workgroup context using the six items developed by Marr, Thau, Aquino, and Barclay (2012), to which 
participants responded on a 5-point scale (1 = Definitely do not want to know, 5 = Definitely want to know) 
and their responses were averaged. Finally, the sociometer theory of self-esteem suggests that exclusion risk 
should result in reduced self-esteem (Leary et al., 1995). To examine whether this is the case, we administered 
the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965). 
 
Results 
Convergent validity 
A CFA found that all the items of the exclusion risk scale loaded significantly onto their latent construct (ps < 
.001). In addition, the variance the construct shared with its indicators was higher than the threshold of .5 (ρvc 
= .69). These results provide evidence of the convergent validity of the measure. 
Discriminant validity 
We conducted an EFA that included measures of exclusion risk, ostracism, loneliness, and coworker social 
support and used oblimin rotation to account for the predicted correlation among the constructs. It showed that 
all the items of the exclusion risk measure loaded strongly onto the same factor (.69–.81) and cross-loaded 
weakly on the remaining factors (.00–.36), interpreted following the thresholds proposed by Comrey and Lee 
(1992). Next, a CFA with the same measures found that restricting the covariance between exclusion risk and 
either of the remaining constructs to one results in a poorer fit of the model to the data (χ2 increase of 21.34 or 
higher, ps < .001). These results provide evidence of the discriminant validity of the exclusion risk measure. 
Nomological validity 
As shown in Table A1, exclusion risk correlated significantly and in the predicted direction with all the 
theoretically related variables: mood (negative affect: r = .39, p < .001; positive affect: r = −.26, p < .001), 
motivation to acquire relationship-threatening information in the workgroup context (r = .24, p = .001), and 
self-esteem (r = −.48, p < .001). These results provide evidence of the nomological validity of our measure. 
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Data Collection 
We recruited an independent sample of 187 full-time employees working in workgroups (Mage = 31.13 years, 
SDage = 9.50, Mtenure = 7.57 years, SDtenure = 4.80; 51.00% male) using the same recruitment mechanism 
as in the first validation data collection. 
To examine discriminant validity, we administered the six-item unethical pro-organizational behavior measure 
by Umphress et al. (2010). Pro-group unethical behavior should be distinguishable from this measure, because 
the beneficiary of pro-group unethical behavior is the employee’s group rather than the entire organization as 
an abstract entity. We also administered the measure of organizational citizenship behavior directed at 
coworkers by K. Lee and Allen (2002). Pro-group unethical behavior measure should be distinguishable from 
this measure, because it benefits others through unethical rather than ethical means. Finally, we administered a 
measure of self-benefiting unethical behavior taken from Barnes, Schaubroeck, Huth, and Ghumman (2011). 
The pro-group unethical behavior measure should be distinguishable from this measure, because the 
beneficiary of the unethical behavior assessed by our measure is the group rather than the self. 
To examine nomological validity, we administered measures of three constructs theoretically related to pro-
group unethical behavior. First, engaging in pro-group unethical behavior requires one to deviate from moral 
rules to accomplish external objectives. We measure respondents’ chronic willingness to disregard moral rules 
to accomplish their objectives using the Machiavelianism scale by Christie and Geis (1970). Next, based on a 
similar reasoning, research suggests people for whom moral values are important for their self-definition 
should be less likely to make moral compromises, such as those required to engage in pro-group unethical 
behavior (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Aquino, Reed, Thau, & Freeman, 2007). To examine whether this is the 
case, we administered the internalization subscale of the Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Finally, 
we reasoned that to engage in unethical behavior for the benefit of the group, the prerequisite is that the 
employee cares about and is committed to the group. Pro-group unethical behavior should thus be positively 
correlated with workgroup commitment. To test whether this is the case, we administered the workgroup 
commitment scale from Bishop and Scott (2000). 
 
Results 
Convergent validity 
A CFA found that all the items of the pro-group unethical behavior scale load significantly onto the latent 
construct (ps < .001). In addition, the variance the construct shared with its indicators was higher than the 
threshold of .5 (ρvc = .58). These results provide evidence of the convergent validity of the measure. 
Discriminant validity 
An EFA with measures of pro-group unethical behavior, pro-organizational unethical behavior, organizational 
citizenship behavior directed at coworkers, and self-serving unethical behavior (with oblimin rotation to 
account for the predicted correlation among the constructs) found that all the items of the exclusion risk 
measure loaded strongly onto the same factor (.64–.78) and cross-loaded weakly on the remaining factors 
(.01–.16). Next, a CFA with the same measures included found that restricting the covariance between pro-
group unethical behavior and either of the remaining constructs to one leads to a poorer fit of the model to the 
data (χ2 increase of 120.06 or higher, ps < .001). These results provide evidence of the discriminant validity of 
the exclusion risk measure. 
Nomological validity 
As shown in Table A2, pro-group unethical behavior correlated significantly and in the predicted direction 
with all the theoretically related variables: Machiavellianism (r = .26, p < .001), moral identity (r = −.17, p = 
.017), and workgroup commitment (r = .21, p = .004). These results provide evidence of the nomological 
validity of our measure. 
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Consistency Statistics 
 
 
Pro-Group Unethical Behavior Measure Validation Data Collection: Means, Standard Deviations, 
Correlations, and Internal Consistency Statistics 
 
